Surveys of Recent Developments in NewJersey Law
In this survey section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents surveys of recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, the Law Review
hopes to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of interesting changes
in significant areas of practice.
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION -

PREMISES RULE - AN EMPLOYER
NEED ONLY HAVE THE CAPACITY TO CONTROL THE AREA WHERE THE
ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN ORDER FOR THE INJURIES TO BE
COMPENSABLE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE ACCIDENT
OCCURRED BEFORE EMPLOYMENT DAY HAD COMMENCED - Ramos v.

M &FFashions, Inc., 154 N.J. 583, 713 A.2d 486 (1998).
Felipe Ramos, a native of Puerto Rico, worked as a laborer in the
agricultural industry until he moved to New Jersey in 1984. See Ramos
v. M & FFashions,Inc., 154 N.J. 583, 587, 713 A.2d 486, 488 (1998).
Roughly one year after Ramos moved to New Jersey, he obtained
employment as a presser at M & F Fashions, Inc. (M & F), a garment
manufacturer. M & F was located in a five-story building in Newark,
New Jersey. The building had only a freight elevator and stairs. Ramos's duties included transporting fabric from the ground floor to M
& F's plant located on the fourth floor and transporting coats from
the fourth floor to the ground floor for shipping. See id. at 588, 713
A.2d at 489. Ramos, as well as employees of other tenants in the
building, used the freight elevator for their work duties. Most employees at M & F, however, did not use the elevator because the doors
would occasionally remain open during use.
Ramos usually arrived at M & F at 7:00 a.m. despite the fact that
he was not required to arrive until 8:00 a.m. nor could he begin work
until that time. Upon his arrival, Ramos would take the elevator upstairs to "read the newspaper, drink coffee, and smoke a cigarette"
before his work day began. Ramos's supervisors approved of his early
arrival at M & F, although most employees typically arrived at 7:30
a.m.. On May 13, 1988, Ramos arrived at M & F at 7:00 a.m.. He
proceeded to the elevator and opened the doors. Upon stepping
into the elevator, Ramos fell down the open elevator shaft, approximately eight to ten feet, and incurred serious injuries, including a
fractured pelvis, a spinal sprain and fracture, a wrist fracture, and a
cerebral concussion. See id. at 589-90, 713 A.2d at 489.
After obtaining a $100,000 settlement from the building's landlord, Ramos filed a workers' compensation claim against M & F. See
id. at 589, 713 A.2d at 489. The Second Injury Fund (SIF) opposed
the application because M & F was by that time defunct. See id. Between November 9, 1994, and September 13, 1995, the compensation
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court held hearings on Ramos's injuries. See id. The compensation
court allowed testimony from Ramos and his doctors, who testified
that he was permanently totally disabled. See id. The SIF experts,
however, testified that Ramos suffered only a permanent partial disability. See id. In finding that the injuries were compensable, the
compensation court reasoned that because M & F used the elevator
for business purposes, Ramos incurred his injuries during the course
of his employment. See id. Furthermore, the compensation court
noted that Ramos was reporting for work at the time of the accident,
notwithstanding the fact that his scheduled work day did not begin
until an hour later. See id. The compensation court further held
that Ramos's injury had left him permanently totally disabled. See id.,
713 A.2d at 490.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed the
compensation court's determination and held that Ramos's injuries
were not compensable because M & F did not control the freight elevator at the time of the accident. See id. at 590, 713 A.2d at 490. The
appellate division stressed the fact that Ramos voluntarily chose to
use the freight elevator and that he voluntarily arrived early for work.
See id. The court also found that M & F did not have control of the
elevator because it was in a common area and was used by several of
the building's tenants. See id. The appellate division therefore held
that Ramos's injuries were not compensable. See id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and reversed the appellate division. See id. The court first explained that
the "premises rule" distinguishes between an accident that occurs on
an employer's premises and one that does not. See id. at 592, 713
A.2d at 491 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. 34:15-36 (West 1988)). Writing for
the majority, Justice Handler resolved the issue of whether or not M
& F controlled the freight elevator at the time of Ramos's accident.
See id. The justice opined that in order to constitute a compensable
injury under the premises rule, the accident must occur after an employee reaches a place controlled by an employer. See id. The justice
further articulated that control of an area "imports the notion of capacity, ability or power to occupy, possess or use" and that once an
employer establishes control, potential liability will remain a threat
until the employer forgoes use of the site. Id.
In the present case, Justice Handler found that M & F employees, including Ramos, used the elevator for business purposes, mainly
to transport fabric between floors. See id. The justice further elaborated that M & F allowed its employees to use the elevator for ingress
and egress rather than using the stairs. See id. Justice Handler then
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concluded that M & F had the capacity to control the elevator. See id.
The court declared that the fact that Ramos was not using the elevator for business purposes at the time of the accident was irrelevant.
See id. Additionally, the justice determined that in order to meet the
requirements under the "premises rule," the employee does not need
to establish that the employer had exclusive control of the area where
the accident occurred. See id. Justice Handler, however, then noted
that the evidence established that M & F used the elevator for business purposes and, thus, M & F had the capacity to control the elevator. See id. Therefore, the justice declared that Ramos satisfied the
"premises rule." See id.
The justice then addressed whether Ramos's employment had
commenced at the time of the accident. See id. at 594, 713 A.2d at
492. Justice Handler recalled that Ramos contended that his early
arrival at M & F was habitual and that the compensation court had
found this explanation credible, despite SIF's contention that Ramos
arrived early for personal reasons. See id. The justice then explained
that courts must give substantial deference to the factual findings of
the compensation court and, thus, the appellate court should have
limited its inquiry to whether the record contained sufficient credible
evidence to support the compensation court's conclusion. See id.
Furthermore, the justice declared that it is the duty of the compensation court to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. See id. The justice
acknowledged that Ramos's testimony before the compensation
court indicated that he arrived at M & F at 7:00 a.m. because he liked
to be early for work and because his supervisors praised his promptness. See id. at 595, 713 A.2d at 492. Further, the justice recalled that
the compensation court determined that Ramos's lack of proficiency
in English coupled with his limited work experience and previous
work-related injuries, suggested that he would have had difficulty
finding other employment if terminated. See id. Thus, the justice inferred that the compensation court's determination suggested that by
arriving early, Ramos felt secure in his employment position with M
& F. See id. Justice Handler determined that the record contained
enough evidentiary support to conclude that Ramos was reporting
for work when the accident occurred. See id. at 594, 713 A.2d at 492.
The majority then analyzed whether the evidence in the record,
namely the testimony of doctors who examined Ramos four and onehalf years prior to the hearing, was sufficient to support the compensation court's finding that Ramos was permanently totally disabled.
See id. at 595-96, 713 A.2d 492-93. Justice Handler noted that SIF
contended that the examinations were too old to justify a finding that
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Ramos's injuries left him permanently totally disabled. See id. at 596,
713 A.2d at 493. The court acknowledged Ramos's contention that a
recent examination was not required because "a permanent total disability cannot be found unless no fundamental or marked improvement in such condition can be reasonably expected." Id.
Justice Handler then opined that a recent medical examination
is only warranted in a situation in which a person has suffered a
permanent partial disability, rather than a permanent total disability.
See id. at 597, 713 A.2d at 493. The justice reasoned that because a
person suffering from a permanent total disability has no reasonable
chance of improvement, a court may presume that the disability had
not significantly improved since the diagnosis. See id. The justice further noted that Ramos was diagnosed with a permanent total disability thirty months prior to the hearing and, therefore, a recent medical examination was not necessary because the diagnosis was made
after permanency occurred. See id. Justice Handler concluded that
the compensation court's finding that Ramos suffered a permanent
total disability was supported by credible evidence from the record.
See id., 713 A.2d at 493-94.
Writing for the dissent, Justice Pollock, joined by Justice Garibaldi, commented that the Legislature's 1979 amendments to the
Workers' Compensation Act abrogated the "going and coming" exception and prohibited employees from recovering for injuries that
occurred as employees traveled to and from work, but permitted certain exceptions. See id. (Pollock, J., dissenting). The justice proffered that the Legislature intended its amendment to limit the class
of employees who were eligible for compensation. See id. Justice Pollock characterized the majority opinion as a return to the "going and
coming rule." See id. Justice Pollock then noted that M & F did not
control the freight elevator at the time of the accident because Ramos was using the elevator for personal passage between the first and
fourth floors. See id. at 601, 713 A.2d at 495 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
Additionally, the dissent posited that the evidence revealed that Ramos voluntarily chose to use the elevator and that M & F did not require its use. See id.
Justice Pollock then likened the present case to Novis v. Rosenbluth Travel, in which the employee was injured while walking on a
sidewalk between a parking lot that the building tenants shared and
the entrance of the employer's building. See id., 713 A.2d at 496
(Pollock, J., dissenting) (citing Novis v. Rosenbluth Travel, 138 N.J. 92,
649 A.2d 96 (1994)). Justice Pollock noted that the Novis court
found that the employer did not control the parking lot at the time
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of the employee's injuries. See id. The dissent further asserted that
courts should require the evidence to show that the employer had a
greater degree of control over the accident site before the injuries
are deemed compensable. See id. at 602, 713 A.2d at 496 (Pollock, J.,
dissenting).
In reversing the appellate division, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has created a previously non-existent exception under the
premises rule, which allows an otherwise ineligible person, such as
Ramos, to receive compensation for an otherwise noncompensable
injury. Ramos's proper theory of recovery would have been under
tort law, a theory which Ramos had successfully raised against the
building's landlord. This decision, however, opens the door to
workers' compensation claims by all employees injured on the
fringes of their employer's premises or near the time they were
scheduled to commence or terminate work. Thus, employees who
sustain injuries either before or after their scheduled work day will
undoubtedly claim, as Ramos did, that they arrived early or stayed
late in order to impress their supervisor and gain job security.
By amending the Workers' Compensation Act, the Legislature
intended to eliminate the "going and coming" exception to the
premises rule and relieve employers from high compensation costs.
See id. at 599, 713 A.2d at 494 (Pollock, J., dissenting). With this decision, the court has interpreted the premises rule to accomplish a just
outcome for an admittedly sympathetic individual rather than to enforce the Legislature's intent. In light of the court's holding, it
would not be surprising if the Legislature again amended the Workers' Compensation Act to exclude compensation in precisely this type
of case.
Scott Carbone

TORTS STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS Two-YEAR STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS BEGINS TO RUN FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND
INFORMED CONSENT WHEN INJURED PARTY KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE
KNOWN OF SUFFICIENT FACTS TO STATE A CLAIM - Baird v. American
Med. Optics, 155 N.J. 54, 713 A.2d 1019 (1998).
In 1983, Plaintiff Eleanor Baird began to experience blurred vision in her left eye. See Baird v. American Med. Optics, 155 N.J. 54, 58,
713 A.2d 1019, 1021 (1998). Plaintiff sought medical attention from
defendant, Dr. Frederick Newman, an ophthalmologist, on September 23, 1983. During the initial consultation, Dr. Newman determined that Baird required cataract surgery. Dr. Newman suggested
that the cataract be removed and replaced with an implant. At the
end of the initial consultation, Baird signed a four-page consent form
for this procedure. Dr. Newman removed the cataract at defendant
Valley Hospital on November 8, 1983. Dr. Newman then implanted
an intraocular lens (IOL) designed by American Medical Optics
(AMO) into Baird's eye.
In 1976, Congress amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95, to include Medical Device Amendments (MDA), which allowed the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to regulate the use of IOLs. At the time of Baird's surgery,
however, AMO had not received FDA approval for marketing its lens.
Instead, the FDA had granted AMO an Investigational Device Exemption (IDE). In addition to providing exemptions from certain
MDA requirements, an IDE allows a manufacturer to conduct clinical
investigations of unapproved devices. See id. at 59, 713 A.2d at 1021.
In performing Baird's surgery, Dr. Newman conducted the clinical
investigation of the IOL. See id.
FDA requirements mandate that doctors obtain the informed
consent of participating patients prior to any clinical investigation using a device subject to an IDE. Moreover, the investigator must provide the patient with a thorough description of the treatment and
discuss potential treatment options with the patient. See id., 713 A.2d
at 1022. The consent form that Baird signed fulfilled the FDA's
minimum standards because it discussed alternative treatments, disclosed that the operation was an experimental clinical investigation
to research IOLs, and presented the procedure's risks and possible
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complications. While conceding that she signed the form, Baird
claimed that no one explained the contents of the form to her and
that she was unaware that she was partaking in an investigational
study. See id. at 61, 713 A.2d at 1023.
Following surgery, Dr. Newman informed Baird of complications that required her to remain in the hospital for three days. As a
result of her continuing difficulties, Dr. Newman performed laser
surgery on Baird on March 9, 1984. See id. at 62, 713 A.2d at 1023.
Following the laser surgery, however, Baird's eyesight worsened and
she experienced further eye pain and infections.
After a referral by Dr. Newman, Baird began to see Dr. James
Bastek, a retinal specialist. During an initial consultation on June 5,
1984, Dr. Bastek determined that Baird suffered from cystoid macular edema and pseudopathic vitritis in her left eye. Dr. Bastek informed Baird that a vitrectomy was necessary, but that initially she
would receive injections in an effort to enhance her vision. Dr.
Bastek recommended that Baird return to Dr. Newman's care for
one month. However, she never returned to Dr. Newman's care.
Baird explained that she was very disillusioned by her entire experience and was discouraged with the results of Dr. Newman's procedures.
On April 15, 1985, Dr. Bastek performed the vitrectomy on
Baird. The procedure, however, resulted in little improvement in
Baird's vision. Approximately two months later, Baird discontinued
her visits to Dr. Bastek, and she consulted three other ophthalmologists between 1989 and 1993. See id. at 63, 713 A.2d at 1023.
In early 1991, Baird discovered a newspaper advertisement that
discussed potential causes of action for people who suffered injuries
as a result of cataract surgery. Baird recognized that her problematic
experiences were strikingly similar to those described in the advertisement. Shortly thereafter, Baird met with the law firm that placed
the advertisement in the newspaper. At this meeting, Baird allegedly
was informed for the first time that the IOL she had received was an
experimental model. See id., 713 A.2d at 1023-24. Portions of Baird's
testimony, however, revealed that prior to this meeting she was aware
of the source of her medical complications. During her deposition,
Baird revealed that she 'just knew" that the implanted IOL was the
source of her discomfort, complications, and continuing need for
surgery. Immediately following the initial cataract surgery, Baird determined that the procedure was the starting point of all her problems. Throughout her testimony Baird commented, "I felt that my
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problems started right from the very beginning when he first did my
cataract surgery." Id., 713 A.2d at 1024.
Baird filed a complaint on February 6, 1992, against Dr. Newman, AMO, and Valley Hospital. See id. at 57-58, 713 A.2d at 1021.
Baird's allegations included the failure of Dr. Newman and Valley
Hospital to obtain her informed consent for the cataract surgery. See
id. at 63, 713 A.2d at 1024. Further, Baird's complaint against AMO
was premised on numerous tort claims, as well as failure to secure her
consent. See id. at 64, 713 A.2d at 1024.
Defendants AMO and Dr. Newman subsequently filed summary
judgment motions. See id. On April 20, 1994, the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, granted AMO's motion and found that the
MDA, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k), preempted the common law claims resulting from IOLs that had been granted IDEs by the FDA. See id. As
such, the court concluded that AMO, as a manufacturer, had met the
requirements of the statute and was immune from common law
claims. See id. The court, however, denied Dr. Newman's similar motion, reasoning that the federal statute applied only to manufacturers. See id. Dr. Newman then submitted a new motion for summary
judgment and argued that the applicable statute of limitations had
expired. See id.
Following a hearing, the court held that Baird's complaint was
in fact barred by the statute of limitations and therefore granted Dr.
Newman's motion. See id. The court emphasized that Baird knew or
should have known of her cause of action no later than 1985, and,
thus, 1987 was the last year in which she could have filed a claim. See
id. Finally, Valley Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment on
May 12, 1994, claiming that it did not have a duty to obtain Baird's
informed consent but, rather, that Dr. Newman had such a duty. See
id. The law division found that Valley Hospital had no duty and,
therefore, granted Valley Hospital's motion for summary judgment
on July 8, 1994. See id.
The appellate division reversed the lower court's holding and
remanded the matter to the law division. See id. First, the appellate
division found that the statute of limitations was not a bar to Baird's
informed consent claim against Dr. Newman. See id. The appellate
division then concluded that Baird did not learn of her potential
claim until 1991 when the attorneys informed her of IOL's experimental status. See id. Further, the court noted that the factual record
was insufficient to determine whether Valley Hospital possessed a
duty to obtain informed consent. See id. at 65, 713 A.2d at 1024. Finally, the appellate division explained that the MDA preempts state
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common law claims only when the FDA has adopted a regulation that
conflicts with the state'law. See id. Thus, the court determined that
AMO had failed to demonstrate evidence of an actual conflict between the FDA regulations and state law requirements, thus precluding a favorable summary judgment award. See id.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification, modified the appellate court's ruling, and remanded the matter. See id. at
58, 713 A.2d at 1021. The court held that the two-year statute of limitations for a patient's informed consent claim begins to run when
numerous complications occur shortly after surgery and alert the patient that he or she has suffered an injury. See id. at 68, 713 A.2d at
1026. As a result, the supreme court determined that Baird's claims,
which were brought more than eight years after her surgery, were
time barred. See id. at 72, 713 A.2d at 1028.
Justice Pollock, writing for the majority, initially explained that,
although the Legislature announced that the statute of limitations on
personal injury actions is two years, it is the court's duty to determine
the accrual date of a cause of action. See id. at 65, 713 A.2d at 1025.
The justice stated that a cause of action for medical malpractice usually begins to accrue on the date that the act or omission occurred.
See id. Justice Pollock acknowledged that the discovery rule was designed to ameliorate the harsh results caused by strict adherence to
the statute of limitations. See id. at 65-66, 713 A.2d at 1025. The
court explained that the discovery rule provides that the statute of
limitations should begin to run when parties know or reasonably
should know that they have been injured through the fault of a particular party. See id. Thus, the court mentioned that by focusing on
the awareness of parties, the discovery rule prevents an action from
accruing when a party is unaware of any injury or unaware of the
party at fault. See id.
Justice Pollock then analyzed when Baird realized or reasonably
should have realized that Dr. Newman's act of inserting the IOL and
his failure to obtain her informed consent were the causes of her injuries. See id. The court examined Baird's testimony transcribed at
the hearing and focused on Baird's statements that she knew that
something was wrong with her IOL from the beginning. See id. at 67,
713 A.2d at 1025. The court emphasized that Baird's testimony indicated that she first realized there was a problem when Dr. Newman
referred her to Dr. Bastek. See id. Thus, the court concluded that
Baird's testimony revealed that she knew no later than 1985 that she
might have a cause of action. See id. at 68, 713 A.2d at 1026.
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The court next addressed Baird's contention that she did not
discover the pertinent legal theory until reading the advertisement in
1991 that addressed causes of action for lack of informed consent.
See id. Justice Pollock agreed with the law division in reasoning that
the statute of limitations does not begin to run upon consultation
with a lawyer, but rather begins when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, indications that she has been injured
through the fault of a particular party. See id. The justice concluded
that Baird's realization of her injuries led her to inquire whether she
had a worthwhile claim. See id. at 69, 713 A.2d at 1026.
Next, Justice Pollock challenged the appellate court's reliance
on Lombardo v. Borsky, 298 N.J. Super. 658, 690 A.2d 150 (App. Div.
1997), certif granted, 150 N.J. 28, 695 A.2d 671 (1997), and appeal dismissed, 513 N.J. 44, 707 A.2d 149 (1998). See id. The justice questioned Lombardo's premise that the statute of limitations for medical
malpractice and lack of informed consent claims should begin to run
on different days because the two claims are fundamentally different.
See id. at 70, 713 A.2d at 1027 (citing Lombardo, 298 N.J. Super. at 667,
690 A.2d at 150). The court denounced the Lombardo principle and
stated that both claims are rooted in negligence because the negligence in a lack of informed consent claim is the doctor's failure to
disclose sufficient information to the patient in order to secure the
patient's consent. See id. at 71, 713 A.2d at 1027. Further,Justice Pollock emphasized that a claimant should not be allowed to delay the
filing of a timely action by selecting a more convenient theory of recovery. See id.
The court rejected Lombardo and explained that the appellate
court mistakenly focused its inquiry on when the claimant became
aware of all potential theories of recovery rather than on the time
when the claimant discovered that he was injured by a particular person. See id. Justice Pollock condemned the Lombardo rule, which
would split the claims by allowing distinct limitation periods. See id.
at 71, 713 A.2d at 1028. The court remanded the case to the law division to allow Valley Hospital and AMO to move for dismissal pursuant to the statute of limitations, as the court set forth. See id. at 72,
713 A.2d at 1028.
Finally, the court seized the opportunity and commented on the
question of federal preemption. See id. Although declining to render a decision on the issue, Justice Pollock voiced the court's agreement with the appellate division in its determination that the MDA
did not preempt Baird's claims against AMO. See id. at 72-73, 713
A.2d at 1028. Following a careful reading of the relevant statutes and
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opinions on the subject, Justice Pollock declared that Congress, the
FDA, and the United States Supreme Court have not proposed that
federal legislation such as MDA should preempt state law claims, but,
rather, that it should elucidate their interpretation. See id. at 76, 713
A.2d at 1030. Finally the justice urged Congress, the FDA, and the
Court to present more lucid regulations, if the goal of MDA is to
eliminate any remedy for injured consumers, so as to cure potential
future uncertainties. See id.
Justice O'Hern, joined by Justice Stein, dissented from the
court's opinion. See id. at 77, 713 A.2d at 1030 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The justice began by accusing the majority of impermissibly
joining the two fundamentally different claims of medical malpractice and informed consent in an attempt to avoid the dispute over the
timing of the lack of informed consent claim. See id., 713 A.2d at
1031 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). Justice O'Hern emphasized that no
jurisdiction has dismissed an informed consent claim before determining whether the experimental nature of the procedure at issue
had been disclosed to the patient. See id. Justice O'Hern then criticized the court for fusing the claims of informed consent and medical malpractice. See id. at 79, 713 A.2d at 1031 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The justice noted the difference between informed consent
and medical malpractice and explained that the former does not require proof of physical damage, whereas the latter does require such
proof. See id., 713 A.2d at 1032 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Hern then instructed that the claims are factually different in that
a lack of informed consent claim emanates from a doctor's failure to
disclose, whereas medical malpractice emanates from the procedure
itself. See id. The justice concluded the initial portion of the dissent
by agreeing with the appellate division's reasoning that the cause of
action should accrue from the moment that the patient learns of the
experimental nature of the treatment, rather than from the time that
the patient discovers an injury. See id. at 80, 713 A.2d at 1032
(O'Hern,J, dissenting).
Next, Justice O'Hern admonished the majority for its analysis of
the legal effect of the consent form that Baird signed. See id. at 81,
713 A.2d at 1033 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The justice argued that a
mere signature on a form does not bind a person if the signature was
procured absent a thorough explanation or if the provisions contained therein were misleading. See id. The dissent emphasized the
existence of a factual dispute concerning the plaintiffs awareness of
the experimental stature of the procedure. See id. Accordingly, Justice O'Hern proffered that the majority erroneously dismissed
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Baird's claim against Dr. Newman. See id. at 82, 713 A.2d at 1033
(O'Hern,J., dissenting). Finally,Justice O'Hern chided the majority
for denying a trial given the factual discrepancies in existence, and
opined that a trial should be elementary in a case in which investigational surgery resulted in the loss of a woman's eyesight. See id.
In rejecting Lombardo v. Borsky, the New Jersey Supreme Court
has set forth a unifying principle that the statute of limitations cannot
be manipulated for the sake of convenience. Displaying strict adherence to the discovery rule, the court placed significant weight upon
the signed consent form. Although the result may appear to yield a
harsh result for Baird, the benefits of uniformity and consistency in
applying the discovery rule to tort cases will far outweigh the disadvantages that such adherence may yield for claimants such as Baird.
It is imperative that defendants be held accountable for their
transgressions, but plaintiff diligence in filing claims is equally important. As the majority noted, Baird's own testimony revealed that she
was aware of her cause of action well within the two-year statute of
limitations period. See id. at 68, 713 A.2d at 1026. Accordingly, public policy dictates that an eight-year delay in filing a claim for lack of
informed consent is unacceptable. Active inquiry into possible
claims is required of a plaintiff when it becomes apparent that his or
her injury was caused through the fault of another. Consultation
with an attorney should take place at that time. The tolling effect of
the discovery rule provides ample opportunity for a plaintiff to seek
legal advice. To permit a plaintiff to delay filing a claim based on
nothing more than convenience contravenes the consistency and
uniformity that the discovery rule seeks to provide.
JeromeDavidJabbour

TORTS SHOULD

CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE SUSPECT
HER
HUSBAND

A WIFE WHO SUSPECTS OR
OF

SEXUALLY

ABUSING

NEIGHBORHOOD CHILDREN HAS A DUTY OF CARE TO PREVENT OR
WARN OF THAT ABUSE -J.S.
v. RT.H., 155 N.J. 330, 714 A.2d 924
(1998).

Defendants R.T.H. and R.G.H. (referred to by the court as John
and. Mary) moved to Vineland, New Jersey, in 1988 and quickly befriended their new neighbors, plaintiffs J.S. and M.S., and their two
young daughters, C.S. and M.S.. SeeJS. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 336,
714 A.2d 924, 927 (1998). Sixty-three-year-old John encouraged the
two minor girls to spend time with his horses, and eventually the girls
visited daily to ride horseback and help care for the animals. Additionally, John would sometimes take the older girl riding on trails in
New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Mary never accompanied her husband
during the time he spent with the young girls. Instead, Mary seemed
to express displeasure at the girls' presence. When Mary saw the girls
with John she would refer to them as "[y]our whores" and on several
occasions she would scream out "[y]ou bitches" from the windows of
her home as the girls rode by on the horses. See id. at 336-37, 714
A.2d at 927. Mary however, never confronted her spouse concerning
the time he spent with the girls. See id. at 337, 714 A.2d at 927.
John sexually assaulted the girls from 1991 until November of
1992, when police caught him with the minors and arrested him.
Mary resided outside of the Vineland home for some time in 1992
and claimed that she first learned of her husband's sexual activity
when her son informed her of John's arrest in November of 1992.
John pleaded guilty to endangering the welfare of minors and was
sentenced to eighteen months in prison. See id. at 335, 714 A.2d at
926.
On behalf of their daughters, plaintiffs filed a civil suit against
John for his intentional acts of sexual assault. See id. Plaintiffs later
amended their complaint to include his wife as a defendant. See id.,
714 A.2d at 927. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that Mary "was negligent in that she knew and/or should have known of her husband's
proclivities/propensities" and that her negligence caused the girls'
harm. Id. In response, Mary filed a motion for summary judgment
and claimed that she owed no legal duty to the girls. See id. The trial
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court granted Mary's motion despite plaintiffs' argument that summary judgment was premature because discovery was incomplete. See
id. at 336, 714 A.2d at 927. Plaintiffs subsequently won their suit
against John, and then appealed the dismissal of their suit against
Mary. See id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed the
trial court's order granting summary judgment and remanded the
matter. See id. at 336, 714 A.2d at 936. The court also ordered an extension of plaintiffs discovery period, ruling that plaintiffs should be
given an opportunity to gather any evidence that may indicate that
Mary had knowledge of John's actions. See id. at 353, 714 A.2d at 936.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for
certification and affirmed the appellate division's decision. See id. at
336, 714 A.2d at 927. The court held that a spouse who knows, or has
reason to know, that his or her mate is likely to engage in sexually
abusive behavior has a duty of care that includes taking reasonable
steps to prevent abuse or warn of the potential of assault. See id. at
352, 714 A.2d at 935. Further, the court declared that a breach of
this spousal duty will be viewed as a proximate cause of the ensuing
harm. See id.
Justice Handler, writing for a unanimous court, began the opinion by describing all of the factors the court must analyze in deciding
whether to impose a duty of care upon a spouse in such circumstances. See id. at 337, 714 A.2d at 928. The justice stated that the
foremost factors the court must address are the severity and the foreseeability of the risk of harm. See id. Then, Justice Handler explained that the court must weigh the opportunities that exist to prevent the harm, the conflicting interests of the parties involved, and
the public policy considerations regarding the fairness of imposing a
duty. See id.
Describing it as the most crucial factor, Justice Handler explained that foreseeability of harm is based on a potential defendant's knowledge of the risk. See id. at 338, 714 A.2d at 928. Citing
various New Jersey cases, the court noted that this knowledge can be
actual awareness or constructive knowledge, if the defendant is in a
special position to obtain such knowledge. See id. In the present
case, the court explained that the totality of the circumstances must
be examined in order to ascertain if it is foreseeable to one spouse
that the other spouse would sexually assault a minor. See id. at 340,
714 A.2d at 929. The court enumerated the circumstances that
would reveal such foreseeability by a spouse: (1) whether the abusive
spouse had committed prior acts of sexual abuse, (2) how frequent
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and egregious these abuses were, (3) the age and gender of prior victims, (4) whether the abuse was directed at a stranger, (5) where the
abuse took place, (6) the abusive spouse's therapeutic history, (7) the
presence of child pornography in the home, and (8) whether the
non-abusive spouse encouraged the abusive spouse's contact with the
victim. See id.
Justice Handler acknowledged that the sexual abuse of a child is
generally difficult to detect. See id. However, the justice clarified,
empirical evidence indicates that a high percentage of child molesters are married men who commit their acts in the home with a child
who is a relative or family acquaintance. See id. at 341, 714 A.2d at
930. The justice opined that because of these facts, the wife of a pedophile is "in a unique position to observe firsthand telltale signs of
sexual abuse." Id. The court concluded that a standard of foreseeability based on "particular knowledge" will not expose a spouse to
overbroad or unrealistic liability. See id. at 342, 714 A.2d at 930. Instead, the court declared, this foreseeability standard is fair in light of
the empirical evidence and common experience that indicates that a
wife frequently knows, or should suspect, that her husband is abusing
an identifiable victim. See id.
The court next considered the parties' interests in deciding
whether to impose such a duty and the strong public policy in favor
of deterring sexual assault. See id. at 343, 714 A.2d at 930. First, the
court addressed the state's strong interest in safeguarding innocent
children from sexual assault and noted the profusion of statutes enacted for this purpose. See id., 714 A.2d at 931. Specifically, the court
discussed New Jersey's sexual abuse reporting statute that requires
that every citizen who has reasonable cause to conclude that a child
has been abused report it immediately. See id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann.
9:6-8.10 (West 1993)). Justice Handler emphasized that this duty to
report sexual abuse, as mandated by the statute, is not limited to professionals such as doctors and psychologists; it also applies to friends
and family. See id.
The court then briefly addressed more than fourteen other laws
similarly designed to protect children from sexual abuse. See id. at
344, 714 A.2d at 931. For example, the court noted, statutes have: established a child abuse task force, encouraged community sexual
abuse prevention programs, implemented background checks for
educators, and strengthened criminal penalties where the victim is a
child. See id. Justice Handler observed that the constitutionality of
the well-known "Megan's Law" was recently affirmed by the court
through a recognition of the societal interest in protecting children
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against molestation. See id. at 345, 714 A.2d at 931. The court concluded that all of these statutes are evidence of the state's zealous efforts to guard children against sexual abuse. See id. at 345, 714 A.2d
at 931.
On the other hand, the court acknowledged that defendants
have an interest in maintaining marital privacy and promoting stable
relationships. See id. Justice Handler discussed the doctrines of interspousal immunity and testimonial qualifications that are prohibited
in litigious actions between spouses. See id., 714 A.2d at 932. The justice acknowledged that, historically, society believed that interspousal
immunity was necessary to maintain marital tranquillity. See id. But
the justice questioned whether marital harmony is actually furthered
by an archaic common law privilege that allows the obstruction of
truth. See id. at 346, 714 A.2d at 932. The court concluded that the
public interest in shielding children from sexual abuse greatly exceeds the individual and societal interest in maintaining marital
harmony. See id.
Finally, in deciding whether to impose a duty, the court addressed the fairness and public policy considerations that such a duty
may implicate. See id. Justice Handler described the "heavy toll" that
sexual abuse exacts both from its victims, who suffer psychosocial
problems, and from society, which frequently must deal with and
care for these troubled citizens. See id. at 347, 714 A.2d at 932. Referring to various studies, the court underscored the finding that today's sexual abuse victims are often the sexual offenders of tomorrow. See id.
Returning to the issue of the state's legislative efforts to combat
sexual abuse, the court concluded that despite the large number of
statutes in existence, the instances of sexual abuse are still far too
many. See id., 714 A.2d at 933. Justice Handler opined that civil
remedies are necessary to enhance the protections that such statutes
provide. See id. at 348, 714 A.2d at 933. The court explained that
studies establish that much of the abuse that occurs is hidden inside
the home, perpetrated by citizens with no prior records. See id. at
347, 714 A.2d at 933. Thus, the court concluded that in this context
civil remedies would be more effective than criminal statutes and notification requirements. See id. at 348, 714 A.2d at 933. Justice Handler then explained that a statute will often provide protection for a
certain group of people by mandating specific conduct and, yet, will
not specifically provide for a civil remedy. See id.
Looking to New Jersey's sexual abuse reporting statute, the
court determined that the Legislature sought to provide broad pro-
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tection against child abuse and did not desire to foreclose civil remedies. See id. Thus, Justice Handler concluded that a court may seek
to further the state's interest by recognizing that an injured class
member has a valid private cause of action. See id. Turning to the
facts at bar, the justice observed that the plaintiff girls are members
of the class that New Jersey's reporting statute was designed to protect. See id. at 349, 714 A.2d at 933. The court acknowledged that the
reporting statute does not expressly provide a basis for civil liability.
See id., 714 A.2d at 934. However, the justice opined, because "the
protections provided, the evils addressed, and the obligations imposed... parallel those that would be relevant in recognizing the existence of a duty," the court will recognize that a breach of this statute may be considered evidence of negligence, especially in
circumstances similar to those in the present case. Id.
The court's final barrier to the imposition of a duty was Mary's
claim that the duty would unfairly force her to control the actions of
a third party. See id. at 350, 714 A.2d at 934. The court responded to
her fears with the assertion that the duty is flexible and requires only
that a spouse who knows, or should know, of the abuse take reasonable steps to warn of or prevent the harm. See id. The court explained that the reasonableness of a spouse's actions will depend on
the particular circumstances of each case. See id.
After imposing a duty, Justice Handler then discussed the issue
of proximate causation. See id. at 351, 714 A.2d at 935. The court acknowledged that even if a duty exists, a court cannot impose liability
where a defendant's actions resulted in an unexpected and "highly
extraordinary" consequence. See id. at 352, 714 A.2d at 935. Distinguishing the present case, the court concluded that the harm incurred by an abused child is a predictable consequence of sexual assault that continues because a wife failed to warn of or stop the
abuse. See id. Hence, the justice declared, Mary's delinquency could
be found to be a proximate cause of the minor girls' injuries. See id.
Finally, Justice Handler decided that summary judgment was
premature. See id. at 353, 714 A.2d at 936. The court noted that Mary
admitted that she knew of or should have known ofJohn's tendencies
and that she was aware of the amount of time that he spent with the
girls. See id. The court reasoned that Mary's admission indicates that
it was "particularly foreseeable" that her husband was abusing the
girls. See id. Furthermore, Justice Handler concluded that a factfinder could ascertain that Mary was negligent, particularly if the evidence establishes that she failed to discharge her duty by not (1)
warning the plaintiffs of the potential risk, (2) confronting her hus-
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band, or (3) keeping a watchful eye on the minors while they visited.
See id. The court remanded the case and directed the trial court to
allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to discover whether Mary knew, or
had reason to know, of the abuse. See id. at 354, 714 A.2d at 936.
The court's holding is a logical step in the state's march to make
heinous sexual crimes against children, like those perpetrated against
victims such as Megan Kanka, no more than a ghastly memory.
Clearly, abused children are a special class of plaintiffs deserving of
the highest protection. The Legislature has recognized this and
should be applauded for the active stance it has taken thus far to enact and enforce protective statutes. As the court noted, because sexual abuse frequently occurs in a home, shuttered away from the public, it is imperative that those closest to the abuse speak out, or are
legally forced to speak out, on behalf of an innocent child. See id. at
347, 714 A.2d at 933.
From a pragmatic perspective, this holding will provide some
comfort to families who may now file suit to recover the costs of what
may be extensive psychological counseling for their children. Most
importantly, the court's holding seems to recognize that giving victims the option of filing a civil suit will have the commendable effect
of empowering families at a time when they most need a sense of
control.
Lisa Pisciotta

GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY AND LIABILITY - LIABILnY UNDER
STATE TORT CLAIMS ACT FOR DANGEROUS CONDITIONS A
PLAINTIFF CAN ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A DANGEROUS
CONDITION ON MUNICIPAL PROPERLY ONLY IF THAT PLAINTIFF ACTED
WITH DUE CARE ON THE PROPERTY Garrison v. Township of
Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 712 A.2d 1101 (1998).
On November 19, 1989, sixteen-year-old plaintiff Dennis Garrison suffered a knee injury while playing touch football on a municipal parking lot owned by defendant Township of Middletown. See
Garrison v. Township of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282, 284-85, 712 A.2d
1101, 1102 (1998). Garrison and his friends used the lot located next
to the New Jersey Transit train station in Middletown for football
games because it was illuminated at night and the lines indicating the
parking spaces served as convenient field boundaries. See id. at 285,
712 A.2d at 1102. Middletown never gave permission to the boys to
play football on the lot, which was typically used for parking by commuters. However, Middletown police officers had previously encountered Garrison and his friends playing football on the lot and made
no objection or effort to try to stop the boys from playing on the lot.
Garrison and his friends were aware that a portion of the lot
within their field of play had an uneven surface. Only part of the lot
was paved and, as a result, the unpaved portion that was mostly loose
gravel was more than an inch lower than the surrounding pavement.
Garrison and his friends compensated for this declivity by agreeing to
avoid the uneven portion of the pavement. At about 9:30 p.m. on
November 19, 1989, however, Garrison encountered the declivity
during a game and injured his knee as a result.
Garrison brought suit against Middletown and New Jersey Transit under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (Act) and alleged that the
defendants were negligent in allowing a dangerous condition to exist
on the parking lot and that the dangerous condition caused his injury. See id., 712 A.2d at 1103. The New Jersey Superior Court, Law
Division, granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants. See
id.
Garrison appealed the judgment in favor of Middletown but did
not contest the court's dismissal of NewJersey Transit as a defendant.
See id. at 285, 712 A.2d at 1103. The NewJersey Superior Court, Ap863
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pellate Division, reversed the judgment and determined that the use
of the parking lot for a football game was foreseeable. The appellate
division further concluded that Garrison's comparative negligence
would not constitute a lack of due care sufficient to bar his claim
against Middletown. See id. The appellate division also held that the
law division erroneously granted summary judgment because Garrison presented sufficient evidence of Middletown's actual or constructive knowledge of the declivity and Middletown's negligence in failing to remedy the problem. See id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and reversed the judgment of the appellate division. See id. at 284, 712 A.2d
at 1102. The court held that a plaintiff seeking to establish a claim
against a public entity for a dangerous condition under the Act must
have acted with due care on the public property. See id. at 292, 712
A.2d at 1106. The court specified that a plaintiff who was engaged in
an unreasonable activity at the time of the accident could not maintain an action. See id.
Justice Pollock, writing for a unanimous court, began by noting
that in order to prove a cause of action under the Act, a plaintiff must
show that the municipality's property was in a dangerous condition
that created a foreseeable risk of injury and proximately caused an
injury. See id. at 286, 712 A.2d at 1103. Justice Pollock further noted
that the Act defines a dangerous condition as "'a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is
used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable
that it will be used."' Id. at 284, 712 A.2d at 1102 (quoting N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 59:4-1(a) (West 1992)).
Justice Pollock asserted that, under the Act, the court should focus on whether the condition of the property imposed a substantial
risk of harm when used with due care. See id. at 287, 712 A.2d at
1103. Therefore, Justice Pollock noted that the court should focus
not on the level of care exhibited by the plaintiff, but instead on
whether a court could determine that a person engaged in a similar
activity under the same circumstances exercised due care. See id.
The justice stressed that if a municipality's property was dangerous
only to users who did not exhibit due care while on the property,
then such property could not have been in a "dangerous condition"
under the Act. See id. However, the justice further emphasized that if
the property was dangerous to all users, then even a comparatively
negligent plaintiff could establish that the property constituted a
dangerous condition. See id. at 287-88, 712 A.2d at 1103-04.
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After examining prior New Jersey cases on the issue, Justice Pollock turned to several California cases that construed the California
Tort Claims Act, which served as the model for the New Jersey Act.
See id. at 289, 712 A.2d at 1105. Justice Pollock observed that the
California courts refused to find a dangerous condition when the
property in question posed a risk only to users who engaged in objectively unreasonable activities. See id. From this observation, Justice
Pollock deduced that the statutory phrase "used with due care" implied an objective standard of reasonableness judged from the perspective of the community. See id. at 291, 712 A.2d at 1106.
Justice Pollock concluded that the proper test the court should
apply to determine whether a municipal property was in a dangerous
condition under the Act was whether the nature of the plaintiffs activity was "so objectively unreasonable that liability for resulting injuries may not be attributed to the condition of the property." Id. at
292, 712 A.2d at 1106. Applying this test to Garrison's claim, Justice
Pollock concluded that the facts in the record failed to indicate that
the declivity posed a substantial risk of injury to the reasonable users
of the lot - the commuters. See id. at 293, 712 A.2d at 1106. Furthermore, Justice Pollock concluded that, as a matter of law, playing
touch football at night on a poorly paved parking lot was not an objectively reasonable use of the lot and was therefore a use devoid of
due care. See id., 712 A.2d at 1107. Thus, the supreme court reversed
the appellate division's decision and reinstated the law division's
judgment dismissing Middletown as a defendant. See id. at 294, 712
A.2d at 1107.
Finally, Justice Pollock defended his analysis against the criticisms of the concurrence. See id. at 293, 712 A.2d at 1107. The justice noted that the Legislature drafted the Act so that the question of
a plaintiffs exercise of due care would be a threshold requirement
for imposing municipal liability. See id. at 294, 712 A.2d at 1107. Justice Pollock explained that the Legislature utilized this drafting
method because the legislative mandate underlying the Act favored
the immunity of municipalities. See id. Therefore, Justice Pollock
concluded that the Legislature structured the Act in such a manner
so that plaintiffs who acted unreasonably on public property could
not recover from municipalities. See id.
Justice Stein, joined by Justice O'Hern, concurred with the majority's result but challenged Justice Pollock's interpretation of the
due care requirement. See id. at 295, 712 A.2d at 1107 (Stein, J., concurring). Justice Stein noted that a significant disparity could result
from the application of the court's "contradictory and illogical" due
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care requirement. See id., 712 A.2d at 1108 (Stein, J., concurring).
According to Justice Stein, application of the court's rule would result in a pothole being labeled a dangerous condition if a plaintiff
were injured while walking over it with due care. See id. However,
Justice Stein further noted that under the majority's rule, the same
pothole would not be a dangerous condition if the plaintiff "tripped
on the pothole while roller-blading backwards," an unreasonable use.
Id. To prevent this disparity, Justice Stein proposed a rule that would
impose liability on a public entity for a dangerous condition if that
condition posed a substantial risk of harm to any hypothetical foreseeable user who exercised due care, regardless of whether the plaintiff was engaged in a reasonable activity. See id. at 306, 712 A.2d at
1113 (Stein,J., concurring).
Justice Stein analyzed the same precedent as the majority, including the California cases, but found those cases to support a conclusion different from that espoused by the majority. See id. at 298304, 712 A.2d at 1109-14 (Stein, J., concurring). The justice noted
that several cases cited by the majority are clear in holding the plaintiffs exercise of due care to be "irrelevant" to the finding of a dangerous condition. See id. at 304, 712 A.2d at 1112 (Stein, J., concurring). According to Justice Stein, the level of care exhibited by the
plaintiff is adequately accounted for in considerations of causation
and comparative negligence and need not be considered in assessing
whether a dangerous condition exists. See id. at 306, 712 A.2d at
1113-14 (Stein,J., concurring).
Despite disagreeing significantly with the majority's approach,
Justice Stein agreed with the court in reversing the appellate division's decision. See id. at 312, 712 A.2d at 1116 (Stein, J., concurring). The justice found that, even assuming that the declivity was a
dangerous condition, Garrison could not establish that it was the
proximate cause of his injury. See id. at 309-10, 712 A.2d at 1115
(Stein, J., concurring). The justice postulated that the fact that Garrison was playing football contributed more directly to his injury than
did the condition of the parking lot. See id. Justice Stein also concluded that Garrison failed to establish that Middletown's conduct
with respect to the lot was palpably unreasonable, as further required
under the Act, and that therefore summary judgment was warranted.
See id. at 310-11, 712 A.2d at 1115-16 (Stein, J., concurring) (citing
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:4-2 (West 1992)).
In denying recovery under the Act for a plaintiff who does not
act with due care in his use of public property, the New Jersey Supreme Court has insulated public entities from liability for injuries to
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recreational users of public property not designated for such use.
This result has both positive and negative consequences for recreational users of public land. Although many types of public property,
such as parking lots and schoolyards, are not designated for general
recreational use, they can and often do serve recreational purposes
during off-hours. The court's holding promotes access to such property for recreational purposes because public entities need not keep
recreational users off their property for fear of liability. According to
the court's analysis, many popular recreational uses of public property could be considered unreasonable for purposes of the Act,
thereby foreclosing a claim of municipal liability for a dangerous
condition by an injured recreational user. Thus, the court's rule
does not force municipalities to drive recreational users off most
public property due to a fear of litigation.
The court's rule, however, does force recreational users to assume the risk of their activities on public property. As Justice Stein
noted, the court's holding may be overbroad in this respect. Under
the majority's analysis, a plaintiff who uses the property in an unreasonable manner cannot maintain a claim of a dangerous condition,
even if the condition would have injured a reasonable user. Thus,
recreational users must assume the risk of abnormally dangerous
conditions in addition to the risks assumed by a reasonable user. Justice Stein, however, would allow a plaintiff who did not exercise due
care in his use of the property to bring a cause of action if the property would have been dangerous to a reasonable user. Justice Stein's
approach, therefore, seems to provide a more workable resolution of
these problems. The justice would adequately protect municipalities
from undue liability by relying on the doctrines of proximate cause
and comparative negligence. Thus, Justice Stein's interpretation of
the Act may be more effective than that of the majority in striking a
balance between the interests of municipalities and potential plaintiffs.
Michael San Giacomo

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RIGHT TO APPEAL - AGREEMENT TO
SETTLE DISPUTE PURSUANT TO THE NEW JERSEY ALTERNATIVE
PROCEDURE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT CONSTITUTES A VALID
BINDING WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL GRANTED BY THE NEW
JERSEY CONSTITUTION AND DOES .NOT TRAMMEL UPON THE NEW
JERSEY SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RULEMAKING AUTHORITY - Mt. Hope Development Associates v. Mt. Hope Waterpower, 154 N.J.
141, 712 A.2d 180 (1998).
In October 1985, the parties in this action executed a joint venture agreement to develop 1280 acres of land in Morris County, New
Jersey (Property). See Mt. Hope Development Associates v. Mt. Hope Waterpower, 154 N.J. 141, 143, 712 A.2d 180, 181 (1998). At the time of
this agreement, defendant, Mt. Hope Mining Co., owned the Property and subsequently conveyed it, pursuant to the agreement, to
Mount Hope Development Associates (MHDA). The joint venture
agreement encompassed the simultaneous development of a hydroelectric plant and a residential project (Project).
Shortly after the inception of their relationship, the parties to
the joint venture were embroiled in a variety of litigation. See id. at
144, 712 A.2d at 181. Although the parties resolved one of their disputes on February 27, 1989, through a settlement agreement contained in a consent judgment, their relationship did not improve.
The parties incorporated the New Jersey Alternative Procedure for
Dispute Resolution Act (APDRA), N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:23A-1 (West
1987), into their consent judgment and, thereby, agreed to have all
disputes relating to the parties' rights and obligations decided according to the strictures of this act. Thus, the APDRA required the
parties to submit all future disputes stemming from this consent
judgment to alternative dispute resolution.
Thereafter, additional disputes arose between the parties, one of
which led MHDA to initiate a lawsuit on December 3, 1992, in the
NewJersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, against various parties
involved in the Project. See id. at 144, 712 A.2d at 181. In response,
defendants sought to stay the action to require MHDA to comply
with the prior consent judgment mandating alternative dispute resolution. See id.
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The chancery court agreed with the defendant's argument and
entered a second consent order on February 27, 1989, which stayed
the litigation and compelled the parties to engage in alternative dispute resolution proceedings pursuant to the APDRA. See id. In the
alternative dispute resolution forum, the parties alleged crosscomplaints which included claims of contractual breach, conspiracy,
tortious interference, fraud, and requests for accountings. See id.
The parties mutually agreed to the choice of a retired superior
court judge to act as the umpire of the dispute. See id. Twenty days
of extensive hearings that involved the testimony of twenty-one witnesses and more than 330 exhibits ensued. See id. Throughout these
proceedings, the umpire entered certain interim relief and final written awards and decrees, which culminated in a final disposition in favor of the defendants on November 21, 1994. See id. Subsequently,
on June 6, 1996, MHDA filed a motion before the chancery division
to modify or vacate the umpire's award. See id. at 145, 712 A.2d at
182. In response to MHDA's motion, defendants filed a motion to
confirm the umpire's award. See id. By order, entered October 17,
1996, the chancery division confirmed the umpire's award. See id.
MHDA appealed the chancery division's order. See id. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and claimed that by incorporating the APDRA into their agreement, the parties waived their
rights to appeal. See id. The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division, concurred with defendants' position and, on January 27,
1997, entered an order granting defendants' motion to dismiss. See
id. at 145, 712 A.2d at 181.
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's
ruling. See id. at 153, 712 A.2d at 186. The court held that, although
adoption of the APDRA waives a party's right to appeal, the APDRA
does not violate the right to appeal provided by the New Jersey Constitution. See id. at 152, 712 A.2d at 186. The court further held that
the APDRA does not trammel upon the constitutional rulemaking
authority vested in the supreme court. See id. As a result, the court
found that the parties' agreement to resolve disputes in accordance
with the APDRA constituted a valid, binding waiver of their constitutional right to appeal from the final judgment entered by the chancery division. See id. at 149, 712 A.2d at 184.
Justice Garibaldi, writing for the majority, began by identifying
the legislative intent and designed purpose of the APDRA. See id. at
145, 712 A.2d at 182. The court recognized that the purpose of the
APDRA was to provide a quicker and less expensive alternative means
to resolve disputes than that provided through civil litigation as well
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as to afford rights not then available through arbitration. See id. The
court further noted that alternative dispute resolution under the
APDRA is voluntary and is only applicable to those parties who,
through contract, agree to be bound by the APDRA. See id. Additionally, Justice Garibaldi acknowledged that a mere reference to the
APDRA in the parties' agreement can trigger their intent to resolve
disputes in the alternative dispute resolution forum. See id. at 146,
712 A.2d at 182.
The court then proceeded to explain the method by which a
court can review an umpire's award under the APDRA. See id. The
justice indicated that a party has forty-five days subsequent to the delivery of the umpire's award and thirty days subsequent to a modified
award to initiate an action in the chancery division to vacate, modify,
or correct the umpire's award. See id. Justice Garibaldi then explained that the APDRA requires that once the chancery division enters an order that confirms, modifies, or corrects the umpire's award,
the chancery division shall enter a judgment or decree which is to be
treated as would be any other judgment or decree. See id. Finally,
the court noted that pursuant to the APDRA, the judgment or decree
is not subject to any further review. See id.
Thereafter, Justice Garibaldi identified plaintiffs' assertions
raised before the court. See id. at 146, 712 A.2d at 182-83. The justice
stated that plaintiffs asserted that the APDRA violates their constitutional right to appeal and that the APDRA trammels upon the constitutional rulemaking authority granted to the supreme court. See id.
Justice Garibaldi began analyzing plaintiffs' assertions by recognizing that the New Jersey Constitution expressly grants a right to
appeal from a final judgment of the superior court's chancery and
law divisions. See id. at 147, 712 A.2d at 183. However, the court cautioned that, although a right to appeal is constitutionally mandated, a
party may waive such a right either by agreement or by stipulation.
See id. The court further noted that the agreement must exhibit a
clear intention, buttressed by consideration, to constitute an effective
waiver of a right to appeal. See id. The justice acknowledged that
such agreements to waive a right to appeal are consistent with the
public policy considerations of encouraging parties' acceptance of
final determinations from courts with original jurisdiction. See id.
The justice recognized that permitting a party to waive the right to
appeal is consistent with the court's well-settled rule of allowing constitutional rights to be waived. See id.
The court then addressed the first issue regarding whether the
APDRA sufficiently notifies parties that adoption of the APDRA con-
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stitutes a waiver of the constitutional right to. appeal. See id. at 148,
712 A.2d at 183. The court determined that four sections of the
APDRA satisfactorily inform parties to a dispute that adoption of the
APDRA's procedures waives their right to appeal. See id. Additionally, the justice relied upon the legislative history of the APDRA,
which states that the only recourse from an APDRA determination is
an appeal to the chancery division. See id. at 148, 712 A.2d at 184.
Thus, the court concluded that the APDRA expressly established that,
by invoking the act, parties to a dispute waive their constitutional
right to appeal the judgment or decree. See id.
The court then analogized the waiver of a right to appeal under
APDRA to waivers of certain other rights that result when parties
agree to settle disputes through arbitration. See id. Justice Garibaldi
noted that, through arbitration, parties waive their rights to a jury
trial. See id. at 149, 712 A.2d at 184. Further, the justice explained
that parties to arbitration, through the limited ability to vacate an arbitration award, waive appellate rights. See id. The court found no
distinction between arbitration and the use of the APDRA that would
prohibit parties electing to utilize the APDRA from similarly waiving
these same rights. See id. Moreover, the court noted commented
that the public policy considerations of the APDRA are virtually identical to those of the Arbitration Act, which include "'finality and limited judicial involvement."' Id. (quoting Tretina Printing Inc. v. Fitzpatrick &Assocs., Inc., 135 N.J. 349, 361, 640 A.2d 788, 794 (1994)).
Finally, Justice Garibaldi stated in dicta that the parties involved
in this action were experienced businessmen who had the advantage
of the advice of counsel throughout these transactions. See id. The
court noted that the plaintiffs could have changed the terms of the
consent judgment and thereby preserved their right to appeal by delineating such a right within the agreement. See id. Since the parties
did not agree to such a change, the court found that the consent
judgment, referencing the APDRA, constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver of the plaintiffs' right to appeal. See id. The court reinforced this conclusion by noting that the plaintiffs' raised their objections for the first time after the conclusion of the entire dispute
resolution process. See id. Because the plaintiffs had not previously
objected to proceeding under the APDRA, the court found the plaintiffs' contention that the waiver of a right to appeal was involuntary to
be without merit. See id.
Justice Garibaldi next examined the plaintiffs' second argument
in which the plaintiffs urged that the APDRA trammels upon the New
Jersey Supreme Court's rulemaking authority over the courts and its
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power to regulate appeals as set forth in the New Jersey Constitution
in article VI, section 2, paragraph 3. See id. at 150, 712 A.2d at 184.
The court recognized that this provision gives the supreme court exclusive jurisdiction over the courts of New Jersey. See id. Furthermore, the court explained that the doctrine of separation of powers
under article III, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution prohibits another branch of state government from impinging upon this
power. See id., 712 A.2d at 184-85. The court, however, acknowledged that the division between the coordinate branches of government need not be absolute; a cooperative effort among such
branches would sufficiently fulfill the mandates of the New Jersey
Constitution. See id., 712 A.2d at 185.
To determine if the APDRA met this constitutional barrier, the
court next examined New Jersey Court Rule 2:2-3(a) (1), which expressly grants parties the right to appeal to the appellate division
from final judgments of the chancery or law divisions. See id. at 151,
712 A.2d at 185. Justice Garibaldi stated that the plaintiffs assertion
was that the Legislature enacted the APDRA to circumvent Rule 2:23(a) (1). See id. However, the court found that the rule is merely a
tool that parties may use to implement their right to appeal granted
under the New Jersey Constitution and, thus, it is equally susceptible
to waiver. See id. Further, the justice stressed that adoption of the
APDRA is voluntary and therefore has no effect on the courts or any
party unless the latter adopts it into an agreement. See id. Thus, the
court found that the APDRA does not violate the separation of powers doctrine because the APDRA does not circumvent either the
court rule or the power granted to the supreme court by the New Jersey Constitution. See id.
The court further supported this conclusion by pointing to New
Jersey's strong public policy in encouraging the use of alternative
dispute resolution procedures. See id. The court posited that a ruling
declaring the APDRA unconstitutional would directly contravene this
policy. See id. at 152, 712 A.2d at 185. Finally, Justice Garibaldi noted
that public policy may warrant overriding the APDRA and granting
appellate review. See id., 712 A.2d at 185-86. The justice concluded,
however, that no such circumstances existed in the present case. See
id., 712 A.2d at 186.
Justice Stein, concurring in part and dissenting in part, first declared that the APDRA facially impinges upon both the constitutional
right of appeal and the court's constitutional rulemaking authority.
See id. at 153, 712 A.2d at 186 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The justice, however, agreed with the majority and
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stated that the courts' construction of the statute sufficiently avoided
any constitutional infirmities. See id. at 154, 712 A.2d at 186 (Stein,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stein accepted the
majority's reasoning that, because adoption of the APDRA is voluntary, the statute is constitutionally sound. See id. Justice Stein, however, unlike the majority, found that a valid waiver did not in fact exist in the current case. See id., 712 A.2d at 187 (Stein, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Stein then noted that there is a presumption against
waiver of constitutional rights and that, without clear and explicit
evidence of a waiver, the constitutional right should prevail. See id. at
155, 712 A.2d at 187 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Further, the justice noted that at the time the consent judgment was entered, the court had not considered the ramifications of
the APDRA's limitation of appellate review. See id. at 154-55, 712 A.2d
at 187 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Therefore, Justice Stein postulated that the parties could not have known
that they had the ability to opt-out of the waiver aspect of the APDRA.
See id.
In sum, Justice Stein found that by the mere inclusion of the title of the APDRA in the consentjudgment, without further illumination of a clear intent to waive specific constitutional rights, the presumption against waiver had not been rebutted. See id. at 155, 712
A.2d at 187 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Therefore, Justice Stein would have granted the plaintiffs the right to
appeal the judgment of the chancery division because the parties did
not waive their constitutional right to review. See id.
With this decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court has strongly
embraced the long-held notion of freedom of contract. Although
the majority does not underscore the importance of freedom of contract, there are times when such freedom infringes upon constitutionally mandated rights and, thus, contractual freedom must be
tempered. Given the importance of such rights, the holding in this
case is overbroad and could readily work profound injustice in the
future.
While the court recognized that the parties to the agreement
were sophisticated businessmen who were at all times represented by
counsel, the ultimate holding is not limited to such circumstances.
Furthermore, although the court acknowledged that in a narrow
range of cases public policy issues may require the court to override
the APDRA, the court made clear that such exercise of its supervisory
function would be reserved for cases presenting "rare circumstances."
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See id. at 152, 712 A.2d at 184. What is left is a wide chasm of situations in which one or both of the parties are not "sophisticated" or
"represented by counsel" and where no "rare circumstances" exist.
The facts of this case may compel one to question Justice Stein's position that the parties' mere reference to the APDRA in the consent
judgment does not constitute a valid waiver.
A mere mention of the APDRA may sufficiently support a finding of a waiver when sophisticated businessmen enter the agreement
after consultation with competent attorneys. However, the same
cannot be said of less knowledgeable, unrepresented parties who may
be signing a contract of adhesion - hardly a "rare circumstance."
This is particularly true when the question concerns waiver of rights
that are considered so precious that the New Jersey Constitution protects them from legislative interference. See id. at 147, 712 A.2d at
183. Surely, in light of the provisions in the New Jersey Constitution,
a private party should not have the power unilaterally to silence its
words.
Mary Hansen Smith

